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Abstract  
Public policies are reflected in the public domain more by how laws are implemented on the ground than by what their 
legislative content is. The departures from legislative intent are often scripted by the non-legislative actors at the cutting 
edge level in public organizations and people outside of the reference frame are often at their wits’ end as to why such 
departures take place at all. This essay takes up two Indian laws—one provincial and the other federal—and relying 
upon Michael Lipsky’s theory of street level bureaucracy, seeks to explore why two critical provisions thereof remained 
mostly unimplemented right since their legislation. Why do the street level bureaucrats mostly intend to depart from the 
avowed intent? Do they really stand to gain in such a scenario of non-implementation? If so, how? These questions are 
discussed in an expanded way in regard to the Bengal Excise Act, 1909 and the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic 
Substances Act, 1985. 
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1. Public Policy: Legislation and Implementation  
1.1 Law and Public Policy 
Laws are enacted in order that certain policy objectives can be achieved in the public domain. Whatever be necessary in 
order that a system of governance can run smoothly in a specific direction is sought to be put in place by way of 
legislation enacted by the competent bodies. Thomas Dye had famously said, “Public policy is whatever a government 
chooses to do or not to do” (Dye, 1972). It is this conscious decision on the part of a government which gets reflected in 
the form of legislations brought out by the elected officials. Whatever a legislature intends is captured in the form of 
laws that are born in the hallowed halls of legislature. 
And laws are not just about what is what. While the substantive laws spell out the broad dos and don’ts, it is the 
adjective or procedural laws that provide the mechanism of getting the things done (Note-1). And both these parts do 
have a substantial role to play in the overall scheme of legislative intent (Note-2). Very often such procedural parts are 
delineated in the body of subsidiary rules framed by way of delegated legislation by the permanent executive. But most 
of the special laws do contain a built-in mechanism providing for such procedural bits. 
Once policies are formulated, the next phase involves their implementation. Public policy implementation refers to the 
exercising of a specific policy decision as directed by the law, court, or any administrator’s prescriptions (D. Mazmanian, 
1983) 
It takes two paradigms, bottom-up and top-down. The bottom-up approach holds that public policy implementation 
process is inseparable from the formulation phase (Matland, 1995) The role of administrators is also considered as critical 
in the success of the formulation and implementation of the policies from the paradigms of the bottom-up approach. The 
bottom creates the need for a given policy. The top then responds by creating the policy.  
The top-down approach in implementing public policies is rather bureaucratic. This approach suggests that policy 
formulation and implementation can be separated into two different entities which do not apparently enjoy the same 
degree of importance, unlike in the bottom-up approach. In the top-down, the ‘top’ is charged with the so-called noble role 
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of making the policy while the ‘bottom’ is in an apparently mundane charge of implementation. However, public policy 
experts claim that any degree of success in policy implementation is a function of integration of both the layers including 
proactive participation of all the stakeholders in the process (B.Milward, 1980) 
1.2 Michael Lipsky & Street Level Bureaucracy  
Michael Lipsky theorizes how the role of cutting edge officials in their capacity as public service delivery agents in 
certain areas of governance can impact the degree of policy implementation since translation of such public policy 
largely hinges upon the knowledge or skill of such officials in regard to implementation of the relevant laws in question 
or their attitude towards implementation thereof on account of multiple reasons. Michael Lipsky broadly categorizes 
police officers and other law enforcement officials, judges in the courts of first instance and public lawyers among 
certain other officials in one expanded bracket and calls them street level bureaucrats and tentatively identifies them as a 
group in terms of multiple behavioral characteristics. As a group, they are characterized by (i) regular and direct 
interaction with citizens, or the recipients of government services and (ii) the power to exercise a degree of discretion 
over the services, benefits and sanctions received by those recipients.  
Lipsky then goes on to show how on account of these factors certain laws and rules are very often enforced in a way 
different from what is devised by the legislature. Laws are after all what capture a public policy in a certain domain and 
thus, a given public policy is bound to suffer in case some of the provisions of such laws and rules are enacted in a way 
which marks an obvious departure from the avowed path of legislative intent.  
But why do the so-called street level bureaucrats act in the way they act? Do they purposely seek to frustrate the 
legislative intent? Or do they do it compulsively? If so, what can be the factors behind such behavior? Let us try to 
understand how Lipsky seeks to theorize the service delivery behavior of such street level bureaucrats and along what 
lines. 
1.3 Policy Formulation-Implementation Dichotomy 
What the street-level bureaucracy theory majorly seeks to propound, among others, is that the policies of the public 
agencies employing such bureaucrats get to be largely reflected in what such public servants do or decide in their work. 
It is chiefly by way of noticing their action on the ground and at the cutting edge level that an ordinary citizen forms an 
idea in regard to what the government apparently chooses to do or not do. Hardly an uninformed and uninitiated citizen 
can be in a position to know, far less assess, what approach a so-called government policy document may contain in 
regard to a specific issue. Of course, one may access such documents online to have an idea in this regard; but then, a 
man on the street is more interested in what happens in reality rather than what may lie shrouded in official language. 
These street-level bureaucrats play a significantly discretionary role as they go about doing their job. The policy framers 
are in fact not always in a position to shape their actions absolutely in tandem with the terms of the public policy 
because such bureaucrats are regarded as specialized officials and thus, their discretionary modifications very often 
acquire some kind of legitimacy within the organizational hierarchy.  
Apart from discretion exercised by the street-level bureaucrats, what else assumes importance in regard to such 
formulation implementation divide is the amount of relative freedom from strict organizational control such officials 
enjoy. Their work can hardly be reduced to certain set rules and formulae and thus, someone not directly in the know of 
their work can really be in a position to supervise them effectively. They may even possess varying perspectives from 
those of their supervisors. Very often, they may also take recourse to such means designed to act as a bulwark against 
the larger policy expectations. They can go on strike, resort to absenteeism or even adopt a deliberately difficult go-slow 
attitude. This admixture of discretion and lack of effective control may often lead to situations not even remotely 
foreseen by the policy framers. 
1.4 The Nature of Stress Confronted by the Street-Level Officials 
But why do the street-level bureaucrats behave in the way they behave? Lipsky lists certain specific factors which he 
thinks are responsible for this. 
1.4.1 Inadequate Resource 
Human resource happens to be the most important resource for every organization and many such street-level 
bureaucrats would be found sadly affected by the challenges emerging out of human resource issues. Often, there are 
too few officials in an agency doing the work of so many and thereby leaving the officials always looking for ways and 
means to customize the work for their own convenience and often to the detriment of the policy interest. There are cases 
where officials are ill-equipped from the training point of view and thus, hamstrung in regard to how to get a thing done 
in accordance with the terms of policy. There are also cases where the officials are badly required to make do with a 
number of serious deficiencies emerging out of lack of organizational resources.  
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1.4.2 Undefined or Contrary Expectations From Organization 
There are cases where government agencies have undefined goals or such goals which may run contrary to the very 
objectives the agencies actually exist for. An organization may develop over the years perspectives which appear to 
stand at variance with the stated policy objectives simply because none really cared about the written words any more. 
There can be situations where declared public policies may differ from actual agency objectives and it may be 
completely beside the mark to be trying to look for any correlation between the two. 
1.4.3 Difficulties in Performance Assessment 
Lipsky then goes on to the necessary corollary of such undefined goals inflicting public organizations. Because of the 
fact of such conflicting expectations from organization, it becomes very difficult to assess the performance of such 
street-level bureaucrats. Lack of clarity about the organizational goals significantly impairs the prospects of officials’ 
performance assessment. Such lack of clarity also results in more than one course of action actually being permissible 
or endorsable in a given situation and there may often be an inherent conflict between one such course of action and 
another. Evidently, performance measurement becomes a veritable problem in such cases and the street-level officials 
thus often suffer from absence of direction. No wonder, they often conveniently choose the course of self-direction. 
1.4.4 Serving the Captive Clients  
Because of the unique nature of their services, clients hardly change the service-providers because of absence of more 
than one service-provider against a given service. This monopoly leaves the clients more or less at the mercy of the 
street-level bureaucrats who in a way takes things largely for granted. They thus find little or no incentives at all in 
reshaping their own course of action under a given circumstance. 
Thus, in fine, going by Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy, such officials are largely found to be working in 
worrisome situations inflicted by scarcity of resources and a disconcerting lack of clarity in their organizational 
relevance. A large amount of compulsive discretion at their disposal coupled with a veritable lack of modalities to 
measure their organizational performance goes to complicate the scenario in a far worse manner. In addition, a 
disturbing extent of monopoly present in the nature of the services they render towards the clients is what places the 
challenge of policy implementation more precariously at the mercy of the street-level officials.  
2. Bengal Excise Act, 1909: A Case Study in Divergence Between Word and Action  
2.1 Bengal Excise Act: Its Policy Objectives 
One of the oldest provincial laws dating back to the days of British Raj, the Bengal Excise Act as is seen now was 
formulated in 1909 with the stated objective of streamlining all governmental action to be taken in regard to potable 
alcohol (Note-3). The Constitution of independent India places potable alcohol in the State List as provided in the 7th 
Schedule in terms of Article 246 and leaves it entirely to the State Government to formulate policies and frame laws and 
rules in regard to that.  
Like in many other States in India, Excise revenue has been one of the most significant sources of revenue for the State 
of West Bengal. The State is free to impose any amount of excise duties on potable alcohol which is meant to be 
officially sold within the State (Note-4) and the State Government has all the authority to ban any operations 
whatsoever in regard to manufacture, export, import, transport, possession and sale of such alcohol or allow them on 
certain conditions (Note-5). The corollary is that any such alcohol that has been manufactured without authority and 
thus situated outside of the realm of collectible State revenue is illicit in terms of law and it is a punishable offence to 
manufacture, sell or transport or even possess such alcohol. In fact, this happens to be a cognizable offence in terms of 
criminal law and, subject to compliance of certain broad conditions, the empowered officials are free to arrest the 
offenders without any warrant issued by the Courts (Note-6). 
Arrests in criminal law are to be preceded and followed by some necessary formalities. In terms of Sections 41 and 41A 
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, none may be arrested unless he be reasonably suspected of having been involved 
in the commission of an offence not to be tried by a Sessions Judge and any of the conditions stipulated vide Section 41 
CrPC be not reasonably satisfied. Arrests within the scope and meaning of BE Act too are guided by the same 
paraphernalia. However, following any act of arrest, all arrestees are required to be forwarded to the court of a Judicial 
Magistrate within twenty four hours from such act of arrest vide Section 81 of the Act read with Article 22.  
2.2 What Happens After the Arrestee is Forwarded to the Court? 
The Bengal Excise Act is a special law and thus, like in many other special laws, there is a distinct difference in terms 
of post detection procedure. The general code of procedure, i.e. CrPC stipulates that right from the first day, i.e. right 
after the forwarding of the arrestee to the Court, the Judicial Officer is aware of the course of investigation not just for 
exercising his judicial power in matters relating to applications for bail pressed by the arrestee but also for deciding 
International Journal of Law and Public Administration                                           Vol. 4, No. 1; June 2021 
4 
other issues, for example, release of property seized at the time of arrest.  
Within the special scheme of things devised by the Bengal Excise Act, the detection of a case is primarily reported to 
the Collector of Excise under Section 78(1) of the BE Act and he remains the supreme authority throughout the 
investigation period vide Section 78(2) of the BE Act in regard to questions involving custody or release of any articles 
seized by the detecting officer. The Collector under Section 74(2) of the BE Act can also drop all the proceedings 
against the arrestee if investigation undertaken by the empowered officer warrants likewise. However, the case is finally 
reported to the judicial magistrate under Section 74(4) of the BE Act if the investigation reveals that there is enough 
evidence to initiate judicial action against him, which may potentially culminate in his conviction. 
2.3 Section 74(4) of Bengal Excise Act: Its Significance Vis-À-Vis Code of Criminial Procedure, 1973 
The Section 74(4) of the BE Act reads: As soon as an investigation by a Collector or by an Excise Officer empowered 
under Section 73, sub-section (2), has been completed, if it appears that there is sufficient evidence to justify the 
forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the investigating officer, unless he proceeds under sub-section (2) of this 
section or under Section 65 of this Act, shall submit a report, which shall for the purpose of Section 190 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 be deemed to be a police report, to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try the 
case and empowered to take cognizance of offences on police reports.  
Several issues emerge out of this text. First, investigation into the commission of offence allegedly committed by the 
suspect has to be completed by the empowered official. Second, such investigation duly completed would have to point 
towards prima facie presence or otherwise of any element of culpability on the part of such suspect. Third, in the event 
of there being no prima facie culpability established by investigation, any further proceedings may be dropped at the 
level of the Collector of Excise which is a quasi-judicial authority in this case. Fourth, prima facie establishment of 
culpability on the part of the suspect would change his status from ‘suspect’ to ‘accused’ in the wake of investigation 
and a detailed investigation report to that effect would have to be submitted by the investigating officer to the Judicial 
Magistrate so that judicial proceedings may be initiated subsequently in that regard. In the event of the allegations 
apparently established by investigation being substantiated in the court of law following a full-blown trial, the accused 
would be handed a sentence in accordance with the penal provisions laid down in the BE Act. And fifth, such 
investigation report which the officer submits to the Judicial Magistrate under Section 74(4) of the BE Act is to be 
treated as a Police Report under Section 190 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
2.4 Significance of Police Report in Terms of Criminal Procedure Code 
Section 2(r) of CrPC defines police report as a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) 
of section 173 Criminal Procedure Code. This is a document of instrument on which the Magistrate can rely for taking 
cognizance of an offence. Section 190 of the Code provides: Subject to the provisions of this Chapter (XIV), any 
Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf [under 
sub-section (2)], may take cognizance of any offence:- 
(a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; 
(b) Upon a police report of such facts; 
(c) Upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such 
offence has been committed. 
The sub-section (2) provides: The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to 
take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire or try.  
Thus, we see that in terms of the code of criminal procedure, a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence by way of 
paying regard to any of these three instruments listed in Section 190, i.e. a complaint, a police report or information 
received from a non-police official unless he proceed to do so suo-motu based on his own information. No such case 
has however taken place in West Bengal as yet when the Magistrate took cognizance of an offence under the BE Act 
otherwise than by way of acting upon a complaint or a police report. 
2.5 What is a Complaint Then in Terms of Code of Criminal Procedure?  
The section 2(d) of the code provides that a complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, 
with a view to his taking action under the code that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an 
offence, but does not include a police report. The definition of complaint clearly distinguishes it from a police report 
which means a report of investigation made by a police officer. A complaint thus means a simple account of allegation 
brought against some person by a non-police official. 
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2.6 Does It Have Any Procedural Implications Depending on Whether the Magistrate Receives a Complaint or a Police 
Report? 
All cases under the BE Act are warrant cases in terms of definition of the term as it’s provided in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. And the code actually provides two distinctly different sets of procedure depending on whether it’s to going 
to be trial proceedings instituted on the basis of police report or otherwise (Note-7). 
In the cases where proceedings are instituted on the basis of police report, framing of charges follows straightaway the 
submission of such report. The Magistrate goes through the detailed investigation report propped up by all the 
supporting documents in a police report case and comes to a decision as to whether there is a prima facie case or not and 
accordingly proceeds further to frame the charges against which the accused would be tried in the court. 
In the cases where proceedings are instituted otherwise than on the basis of police report, such framing of charge does 
not take place straightaway after submission of complaint or otherwise. The fundamental reason why the Magistrate 
does not proceed immediately with framing of charge in such a scenario is that he wants to be apprised of the prima 
facie case before any further judicial action is undertaken at his end. The code thus provides for recording of all 
pre-charge evidence in front of the Magistrate under Section 244 of Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that 
when in any warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the accused appears or is brought before a 
Magistrate, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in 
support of the prosecution. In the police report cases however the Magistrate proceeds towards the charge-framing stage 
after going through the case diary of the investigating officer maintained under section 172 CrPC along with all the 
statements of the prosecution witnesses including that of the detecting officer recorded by the investigating officer 
under section 161 CrPC. 
Why does the code distinguish one set of cases from another? What might be the legislative intent? 
The police report cases which are also otherwise known as charge-sheet cases or completion report cases reach the 
courts only after an exhaustive round of investigation done by a competent police officer. It is the mandate of legislature 
that investigation be done prior to such cases reaching the courts and it is also the mandate of legislature that determines 
as to police officers of what level should conduct such investigation and understandably, the legislative intent is 
satisfied on account of that. The Code of Criminal Procedure legitimizes whatever investigation is done at least to the 
extent required for the Magistrate to find a prima facie case to proceed unless he decide otherwise to discharge the 
accused, based on his appreciation of arguments submitted by the defense under section 239 CrPC (Note-8).  
A completely different procedure is adopted in the cases instituted otherwise than on the basis of police reports, i.e. the 
Magistrate himself hears all the depositions made by the prosecution witnesses in the open court in presence of the 
accused before he decides whether there is any prima facie case against the accused. This is required for ensuring that 
none is prejudiced while he be tried for an offence within the scope and meaning of criminal jurisprudence. There are 
many government agencies without appropriate powers of criminal investigation vested on their officers, for example, 
erstwhile Sales Tax authorities. However, their officers too detect cases that call for criminal proceedings in terms of 
their respective laws and accordingly, they lodge complaints with the Magistrates. Those officers not being vested with 
powers of police investigation in terms of the provisions of CrPC, the Magistrate is not in a position to proceed 
straightaway with charge-framing because he has to be satisfied first about a prima facie case being there made out 
against the accused. 
The same reason holds ground when the Magistrate faces a situation envisaged in clause (c) of sub-section 1 of section 
190 CrPC, i.e. where he can take cognizance of offence upon information received from any person other than a police 
officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. A conjoint reading of this clause and the 
clause (a) of the same sub-section implies that any person other than a police officer as mentioned here would include a 
private person (Note-9) How can a Magistrate proceed straightaway with charge-framing against a person based upon 
an allegation made by a private person or more interestingly, relying upon his own knowledge about commission of an 
offence by him without an obvious risk of lack of transparency in that regard? The apparent conundrum is resolved in 
Section 191 whereby such a case where cognizance is sought to be taken in terms of clause (c) of sub-section 1 of 
section 190 CrPC may be transferred for further proceedings to a different Magistrate, subject to submission by the 
accused. In that scenario too, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of commission of the offence on the basis of his 
own investigation. The job of investigation even in such a case is ordinarily required to be done by Police (Note-10) 
Thus, it emerges that the provision for recording pre-charge evidence has been there in respect of non-police report 
cases with a view to ensuring there be no executive bias against the accused. The Magistrate himself hears all the 
depositions of prosecution witnesses in presence of the accused and proceeds either to frame charge under Section 246 
CrPC or discharge the accused under section 245 of the Code. And in police report cases, he does not go through the 
additional process of recording pre-charge evidence from the prosecution witnesses since he relies upon the account of 
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investigation duly done by empowered police officials. The accused in this case has however an opportunity under 
section 239 CrPC to rebut the proposed charge brought by the prosecution. 
2.7 Real Implication of Recording Pre-Charge Evidence in a Non-Police Report Case 
On an average, it takes a minimum of 10 years for complete disposal of a case booked by an Excise officer under BE 
Act, 1909 while it is almost half the time so taken for a case booked by Police under the same Act to be disposed of 
(Note-11). Why such a vast divergence in terms of time taken for disposal of cases, depending upon who happens to be 
the prosecuting agency despite that both the agencies apply the selfsame substantive law in their respective proceedings? 
Could this ever be the true legislative intent?  
But first, let’s look at the factors responsible for this huge time difference in respect of disposal of a case booked by an 
Excise officer under the BE Act vis-à-vis such a case booked thereunder by his Police counterpart. 
The courts in West Bengal like anywhere else in India are clogged with cases and infrastructural paucities (K.Jayanth 
Krishnan, 2011). No magisterial court in West Bengal can afford to hear the same matter on more than two occasions in 
a year (Note-12). This is what most importantly explains the extra time taken for disposal of a case booked by an Excise 
officer under the BE Act. A police officer submits the investigation report under Section 173 CrPC and thus, a case 
booked and investigated by a Police officer can sidestep the process of pre-charge evidence recording and gain 
considerably in terms of time taken for disposal. Not so a case investigated by an Excise officer!  
Now, as regards our unanswered question, was this ever the true legislative intent? Understanding that in both the cases, 
i.e. whether it’s investigated by Police or Excise, it’s the State of West Bengal who presses the prosecution within the 
scope and meaning of the selfsame law of the Bengal Excise Act, doesn’t it result in an unintended discrimination 
between the two likes? And in that case, does it not jeopardize the law of equality and thereby, the rule of law?  
3. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat and Section 74(4) of the BE Act 
The jurisprudential maxim implies that it is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it. A statute is supposed to be an 
authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it in terms of that legislative intent. 
The court should as far as possible avoid a construction which would attribute irrationality to the Legislature. It must 
obviously prefer a construction which renders the statutory provision valid rather than that which would make it void 
(Note-13). The rule is well-settled that a construction which imputes to the Legislature tautology or superfluity in terms 
of use of language must be, as far as possible, avoided. The Court should always prefer a construction which will give 
some meaning and effect to the words used by the Legislature, rather than that which will reduce it to futility (Note-14). 
Thus, when a harmonious construction is possible which furthers the objects of the Act, the same is preferred to that 
which might lead to any conflict between the two possible propositions (Note-15) No part of the statute can just be 
ignored by saying that the Legislature enacted the same not knowing what it was saying. It is to be assumed that the 
Legislature deliberately used that expression and it intended to convey the same meaning (Note-16)  
Now, coming to the Section 74(4) of the BE Act, it concludes that following the investigation undertaken “the 
investigating officer (…) shall submit a report, which shall for the purpose of Section 190 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 be deemed to be a police report…” The use of ‘shall’ as auxiliary verb in respect of a third person 
singular number subject (i.e. ‘report’) unfailingly conveys an element of compulsion and leaves no room whatsoever for 
any discretion to be exercised by the Magistrate as to whether to treat such report as a police report or otherwise. In 
other words, the Court must view such report of investigation submitted by the investigating officer under section 74(4) 
of the BE Act as a report defined vide section 2(r) of CrPC, i.e. treated at par with the report submitted under 
sub-section (2) of section 173 CrPC.  
Thus, in terms of the procedural mandate of the special law read with the provisions of criminal procedure code, there is 
simply no scope for recording pre-charge evidence under Section 244 CrPC before proceeding towards charge-framing 
unlike in the non-police report cases.  
Still the investigation reports submitted under section 74(4) of the BE Act, 1909 have always been treated as so-called 
‘complaints’ and as a consequence, disposal of Excise cases under the BE Act, 1909 booked by Excise Officers has 
been witnessing an inordinate delay vis-à-vis the cases booked by Police and investigation reports submitted under 
sub-section (2) of section 173 CrPC. As a fall-out, the administration of justice suffers even as such an important 
procedural legal mandate has remained unimplemented. What could be the factors responsible for this?  
4. NDPS Act: Another Case Study in Legislation-Implementation Divide  
4.1 Section 52A of NDPS Act and the Intent Behind 
The much criticized (Note-17) anti-narcotics law titled Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act was promulgated in 
India in 1985 with an eye on putting massive curbs on all illicit supply channels of narcotic substances. The legislature 
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turned out to be even more realistic when Section 52A was incorporated in 1989 (Note-18) and the very text of sub-Section 
(1) thereof is more than eloquent about the legislative intent of the amendment in question: 
Section 52A: Disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances: 
(1) The Central Government, may, having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution, 
constraint of proper storage space or any other relevant consideration, in respect of any narcotic drugs, 
psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify 
such narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyance or class of narcotic drugs, 
class of psychotropic substances, class of controlled substances or conveyances, which shall, as soon as may be 
after their seizure, be disposed of by such officer and in such manner as that Government may, from time to time, 
determine after following the procedure hereinafter specified. 
While the opening sub-section encapsulates the enabling provision for such disposal, the three subsequent sub-sections 
provide the detailed modality and the legislative sanctity of such modalities vis-à-vis the provisions of the Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
4.2 Section 52A (2) Provides 
Where any narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances has been seized and forwarded 
to the Officer-in-Charge of the nearest Police Station or to the Officer empowered under Section 53, the Officer referred to 
in sub-Section (1) shall prepare an inventory of such narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or 
conveyances containing such details relating to their description, quality, quantity, mode of packing, marks, numbers or 
such other identifying particulars of the narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances or 
the packing in which they are packed, country of origin and other particulars as the Officer referred to in sub-Section (1) 
may consider relevant to the identity of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances in 
any proceedings of this Act and make an application to any Magistrate for the purpose of: 
(a) Certifying the correctness of the inventory so prepared; or 
(b) Taking in the presence of such Magistrate, photographs of such drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled 
substances or conveyances and certifying such photographs as true; or 
(c) Allowing to draw representative samples of such drugs or substances in the presence of such Magistrate and 
certifying the correctness of any list of samples so drawn. 
Section 52A (3) provides that where an application is made under sub-section (2), the Magistrate shall, as soon as may be, 
allow the application while the sub-section (4) says that notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 
1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, every Court trying an offence under this Act, shall treat the inventory, the 
photographs of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances and any list of samples 
drawn under sub-section (2) and certified by the Magistrate, as primary evidence in respect of such offence. 
4.3 Express Legislative Intent in Section 52A 
Let’s try to understand the sententia legis involved here. The opening sub-Section sets out the context that deals with the 
compelling exigencies which might require the Government of India to bring out certain modalities sanctioned by 
legislation towards disposing of such seized substances much before conclusion of trial. After the Central Government 
brings it out, all other relevant stakeholders, i.e. the drug law enforcement officers effecting the seizure in sub-section (2), 
the Judicial Officer mentioned in sub-section (3) and the trying court mentioned in sub-section (4) are left with no scope 
for discretion but to act in the direction set out by the Central Govt. by way of such notification or Standing Order. The 
Central Govt. came out with such directives post this Section 52A for the first time in 1989 itself in the form of Standing 
Order 1/89 dated 13.06.1989. 
Thus, it is the Central Govt. alone who had this discretion granted by the enabling provision vide sub-Section (1) of the 
Section 52A while the Judicial Officer mentioned in sub-Section (3) as well as such Officer meant vide sub-Section (4) 
were intended to have a compulsion to proceed in the direction envisaged therein. The very mention of the auxiliary verb 
shall on both the occasions says it all too clearly (Note-19)  
But there is a mention of shall in sub-section (2) as well and there too it is used in regard to a third person singular number 
subject, i.e. the drug law enforcement officer. The ball is supposed to start rolling only after the drug law enforcement 
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4.4 The Mohanlal Case & Section 52A 
No law achieves its purpose if it’s left unimplemented and the case of Union of India vs. Mohanlal & Another unfailingly 
pointed out once again the shocking degree of non-application of this specific provision of the NDPS Act almost across the 
spectrum throughout the country. The Apex Court undertook a country wide exercise to study the level of implementation 
of this mandatory provision of the NDPS Act and the findings were shocking enough to galvanize the administrative 
machinery of the Apex Court. 
Let’s look at some of the observations of the Apex Court in connection with the Mohanlal case: 
On 3rd July, 2012 this Court after hearing the Amicus Curiae prima facie came to the conclusion that the procedure 
prescribed for the destruction of the contraband seized in different States was not being followed resulting in a very piquant 
situation in which accumulation of huge quantities of the seized drugs and narcotics has increased manifold the chances of 
their pilferage for re-circulation in the market. 
This Court also noted a report published in the timesofindia.indiatimes.com under the heading "Bathinda's police stores 
bursting at seams with seized narcotics" from which it appeared that large quantities of seized drugs had accumulated over 
the years including opium, poppy husk, charas etc. apart from modern narcotic substances. The report suggested that 39 
lakhs sedatives and narcotic tablets, 1.10 lakhs capsules, over 21,000 drug syrups and 1828 sedative injections apart from 8 
kgs. of smack and 84 kgs. of ganja were awaiting disposal in Bathinda Police stores alone.(Paragraph-2) 
There is in our opinion no manner of doubt that the seizure of the contraband must be followed by an application for drawing 
of samples and certification as contemplated under the Act. There is equally no doubt that the process of making any such 
application and resultant sampling and certification cannot be left to the whims of the officers concerned. The scheme of the 
Act in general and Section 52A in particular, does not brook any delay in the matter of making of an application or the 
drawing of samples and certification. While we see no room for prescribing or reading a time frame into the provision, we 
are of the view that an application for sampling and certification ought to be made without undue delay and the Magistrate on 
receipt of any such application will be expected to attend to the application and do the needful, within a reasonable period 
and without any undue delay or procrastination as is mandated by sub-section (3) of Section 52A. We hope and trust that the 
High Courts will keep a close watch on the performance of the Magistrates in this regard and through the Magistrates on the 
agencies that are dealing with the menace of drugs which has taken alarming dimensions in this country partly because of the 
ineffective and lackadaisical enforcement of the laws and procedures and cavalier manner in which the agencies and at times 
Magistracy in this country addresses a problem of such serious dimensions.(Paragraph-14) 
Following Mohanlal, all the High Courts in the country did swing into action. Special committees of Judges were formed in 
every High Court and Special Narcotics Judges took the initiative to physically inspect the storage places where the drug law 
enforcement agencies kept the seized narcotic alamats. Drug law enforcement agencies are almost regularly now presenting 
applications under Section 52A and the specially designated Magistrates are duly dealing with them.  
But why did it take more than 26 long years and an unusual judgment from the Apex Court encompassing a pan-India 
exercise spanning over four years (Note-20) to put on track a serious piece of legislation already enacted by the Parliament of 
India? 
5. Lipsky’s Theory & the Case Studies in Divergence  
5.1 Revisiting the BE Act Conundrum 
But let’s try first to address the Bengal Excise riddle in terms of Lipsky’s theory of street level bureaucracy. Why wasn’t the 
import of Section 74(4) made use of with an eye on early disposal of court cases despite manifest legislative intent to that 
effect? We can find an answer in Lipsky’s logic.  
Despite anything and everything said to the contrary, State Excise in West Bengal primarily remains a revenue organization 
and thus mobilization of revenue has remained its principal initiative. No doubt, there are enforcement activities and 
consequent prosecution procedure when someone is caught cheating on this revenue objective but such enforcement 
activities occupy a miniscule importance in terms of organizational scheme of things (Note-21). Liquor after all is not 
banned in West Bengal and thus, enforcement activities there are more regulatory in nature than fundamentally geared 
towards policing. Officials too in West Bengal Excise are fundamentally revenue officials and thus, largely un-impacted by 
the protocol of a police organization in terms of functioning (Note-22). Going by the Lipsky logic, the existence of a 
provision like Section 74(4) in the scheme of Bengal Excise Act has not really gelled with the overall organizational 
objective. It’s a singular provision cloaked in police language whereas the entire organization essentially functions along 
non-police lines. Thus, there remains a significant divergence from the overall organizational goal vis-à-vis this Section 74(4) 
of BE Act, which has put the implementation of this specific provision on the backburner, as it were.  
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What is more, in absence of such generic objective to implement this specific provision of law, there have emerged other 
vested interests in favour of its non-implementation too. An investigating Excise Officer is required to do a lot less work 
when the investigation report is treated as a complaint. He can just report to the court, complaining against a specific person 
without going through all the rigours of investigation enjoined upon him in terms of Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and leave the entire work of such investigation to be done by the Judicial Magistrate by way of inquiry. Defence 
lawyers are happy as well because this so-called complaint case procedure prolongs a case and thereby affords him a much 
better scope for earning by way of larger number of appearance opportunities (Note-23). The monopoly of service providers 
being the other reason forwarded by Lipsky to be behind non-implementation of laws also finds some substance on this point. 
The accused have to depend on his counsel and more or less all such defence counsels in the lower courts are driven by the 
same calculations. And the State prosecutors appearing in lower courts have absolutely no incentives whatsoever in ensuring 
any expeditious conclusion of proceedings because their performance assessment does not really hinge on such issues 
(Note-24). This too conforms very much to what Lipsky says in regard to performance assessment issues having an adverse 
impact on implementation of laws. 
And going by the same Lipsky logic, it’s probably only the Judicial Magistrates who should have an incentive to ensure early 
disposal of such cases since rate of disposal has a definitive bearing on their performance appraisal. West Bengal Judicial 
Academy has however already started going about it. (Note-25) 
5.2 Factors Behind Non-Implementation of Section 52A of NDPS Act 
How is it that organizations like Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) under Department of Revenue, Govt. of India or 
Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) under Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India or even Customs, etc almost religiously 
implemented the mandate of Section 52A of the NDPS Act while State Police organizations almost all over the country 
faltered as a matter of routine? Once again, we may turn to Lipsky. Organizations suffering from clarity of goal vis-à-vis a 
specific provision of law may often find themselves faltering in regard to implementation thereof. NDPS Act has quite a few 
stringent provisions which are often branded as draconian. Section 37 provides one such stringency. It mandates that no 
person accused of an offence punishable for offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27A and also for offences 
involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless…the Court is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on 
bail. The sub-Section (2) further commands that the limitations on granting of bail specified … are in addition to the 
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail. It remains 
a kind of open secret that State Police organizations in India have had an unenviable track record of using this specific 
provision for a range of extra-anti-narcotic purposes. Even the Law Commission’s 277th Report on “Wrongful Prosecution 
(Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies” is eloquent on how Police fabricates FIRs with an eye on ensuring denial of bail to 
someone for a considerable period of time. Provisions like Section 37 of NDPS Act provide an apparently easy opportunity 
to that effect. Officers in charge of Police stations often are compelled to clamp such charges on persons who they 
desperately endeavour to keep behind the bars for a certain period of time. 
Keeping a ready stock of seized narcotic drugs in the police go-downs apparently comes in handy under such circumstances 
since a minimum of stipulated commercial quantity of narcotic drugs has to be presented by the seizing agency as the 
quantity of seized drugs every time someone is sent to the Court by the agency officials on drug charges. The pending stock 
of drugs understandably serves that purpose (Note-26). In other words, under such circumstances, Police doesn’t exactly do 
what he is supposed to do as a Policeman and, there often remains a severe lack of clarity of purpose within the organization 
as to what he should do and how. The non-implementation of the Section 52A largely stems from there. Obviously, any such 
due compliance of the Section would put him in an unpredictably difficult situation!  
No such predicament however confronts an NCB official or his counterpart in Customs or DRI since NCB, DRI or Customs 
are not required to handle law-and-order situations that are more often than not punctuated with sharp political overtones. 
These non-police agency officials thus know what they do and are aware of why they do what they do. Organizational goal 
or the lack thereof hardly makes them confront situations laden with any unwholesome potential of holding them back from 
implementation of this piece of legislation. 
6. Conclusion 
The Apex Court has cracked the Mohanlal whip no doubt. But it would be an interesting study none the less to see how an 
organization like State Police pits itself against the demands of due procedure of Section 52A of the NDPS Act in view of the 
principal challenges confronted by the agency and its men in this regard. Whether the judicial directive from the highest level 
will be honored in its entirety or diluted beyond redemption will definitely remain something to watch out for. 
As regards the issue exposed in regard to the Bengal Excise Act, it might be still difficult on the part of agency officials to do 
full justice to the import of Section 74(4) of the Bengal Excise Act given the fact that the agency would always remain 
primarily a revenue organization provided West Bengal does not embrace prohibition as a state policy. The agency will 
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always have an intrinsic force to remain auto-directed more towards the issues related to revenue mobilization and far less 
towards compliance of rules of criminal procedure in the court of law. On the other hand, it would be interesting to see how 
the sensitization of the judicial officers in the State undertaken by the Judicial Academy can go to leave a more meaningful 
impact on such compliance. After all, it is the courts alone that stand to benefit from such compliance in this case.  
Endnotes  
1. Note-1: For example, the Indian Penal Code lists out the offences and defines them while the Code of Criminal 
Procedure provides the mechanism as to what exactly has to be done by a criminal law enforcement official 
following detection of an offence and apprehension of an offender and even afterwards, how the entire issue must be 
addressed and disposed of by a judicial officer. There are also certain enactments which contain a broadly 
self-sufficient framework providing both the substantive and the procedural parts subject however to the overarching 
mandate of the general law.  
2. Note-2: The procedural parts do go an equally long way in translating the legislative intent into reality. They spell out 
for the relevant actors as to how to do what the substantive law wants them to do.  
3. Note-3: Its preamble sets out the agenda: “An Act to consolidate and amend the Excise law in Bengal. Whereas it is 
expedient to consolidate and amend the law in Bengal relating to the export, import, transport, manufacture, 
possession and sale of intoxicants…”  
4. Note-4: This however excludes potable alcohol imported from outside of India and sold afterwards within the State. 
Such articles attract Customs duty imposed by the Government of India while the State Government does levy 
certain fees on that.  
5. Note-5: See chapters III, IV & V of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909 
http://wbexcise.gov.in/writereaddata/bengalexciseact.pdf  
6. Note-6: Section 67 of the Bengal Excise Act read with Section 81 thereof and Chapter V of Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973. http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1974-02.pdf  
7. Note-7: While Part A of CrPC, Chapter XIX provides the procedure of trial of warrant cases instituted on the basis of a 
police report, Part-B thereof provides the trial procedure of cases instituted otherwise than on the basis of police 
report. http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1974-02.pdf  
8. Note-8: Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides this.  
9. Note-9: Surrendro Nath Roy (1870) 13 WR (Cr) 27  
10. Note-10: K.Shankaraiah vs. State of AP, 1983 CrLJ (1296) AP  
11. Note-11: This is based on the author’s inspection of data of court cases maintained in Excise units all over West 
Bengal. There are even cases which have been running for close to 25 years in courts of judicial magistrates and not 
yet disposed of!  
12. Note-12: In fact, such is the enormous workload at the courts that often there are occasions when the Magistrate gets to 
hear only once during an entire year. Thus, supposing there being on an average eight or ten officials on the part of 
the prosecution, it takes a minimum of five or six years to complete the process of pre-charge evidence recording. 
This is in addition to multiple other factors responsible for delay, such as, absence of the accused on the day of 
evidence, adjournments moved by the prosecution, absence of prosecution witnesses for recording of such evidence 
once they get transferred out of the district where the detection took place, etc.  
13. Note-13: K.P. Varghese v. ITO[1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC); State of Punjab v. Prem Sukhdas [1977] 3 SCR 403 14. 
Note-14: CIT v. R.M. Amin [1977] 106 ITR 368 (SC); Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Mfrs. Association [1980] 
121 ITR 1 (SC)  
15. Note-15: CWT v. Yuvraj Amrinder Singh [1985] 156 ITR 525 (SC)  
16. Note-16: CIT v. Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd.[1972] 83 ITR 377 (SC)  
17. Note-17: NDPS Act remains one of the worst criticized laws in India on account of its stringent measures including its 
framework of graded penal structure and virtual absence of judicial discretion in regard to grant of bail in favor of the 
accused.  
18. Note-18: This was further amended in 2014 and seized controlled substances and conveyances were included as 
articles meriting such disposal.  
19. Note-19: The exclusion of auxiliary verbs like may or will and use of shall for a third person singular subject like 
‘magistrate’ or ‘court’ clearly envisages there is no scope for discretion to be exercised by the magistrate in 
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sub-Section (3) in regard to whether he should allow such an application; or in sub-Section (4) whether such 
photographs and other records duly certified should be allowed to be treated as primary evidence notwithstanding the 
provisions contained in The Evidence Act, 1872. The national legislature has thus thrust a compulsion on the judicial 
officers in this regard.  
20. Note-20: The exercise continued from 2012 till 2016  
21. Note-21: A completely different scenario emerges in a prohibition State like Bihar or Nagaland, etc where the entire 
organizational goal in Excise is geared towards policing.  
22. Note-22: The revenue entity of Excise officials was also officially endorsed when Excise ceased to exist as a separate 
Department and Excise Directorate became one of the Directorates under Department of Finance in 2018. 
Supervisory officers too became part of West Bengal Revenue Service.  
23. Note-23: Excise offenders come out on bail all too easily, unlike drug offenders and thus, the defence lawyers are 
hardly under any obligation to see these cases come to any early conclusion. Complaint case procedure suits them 
very well.  
24. Note-24: Theirs is a service which does not hold out any prospects of promotion. An Assistant Public Prosecutor who 
is appointed by the Government to present cases for the State in the JM courts does not get to become a Public 
Prosecutor at the District Judge’s Court by promotion. Someone who is selected as an Assistant Public Prosecutor 
gets to retire as an Assistant Public Prosecutor.  
25. Note-25: West Bengal Judicial Academy has already started addressing this issue. Judicial Magistrates are being duly 
sensitized about such provisions of law and how exactly the same may be duly leveraged.  
26. Note-26: There are reports that State Police agencies almost everywhere in the country do resort to clamping false 
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